Eisenhower would leave his post by an agreement because Eisenhower`s technical advisors, on whom he relied heavily, were involved in the complex technical issues of a test ban, partly motivated by the keen interest of American experts in reducing the error rate of seismic test detection technology.   Some, including Kistiakowsky, may finally express concerns about the ability of inspections and monitors to successfully detect tests.  The main product of the negotiations under Eisenhower was the test moratorium without an enforcement mechanism.  In the end, the objective of a total ban on testing would be abandoned in favour of a partial ban due to seismic detection issues related to underground testing.  The treaty states that its « primary objective is to reach a general and comprehensive disarmament agreement under strict international control as soon as possible » and explicitly states the objective of a total ban on testing (an agreement prohibiting underground testing). The treaty permanently prohibits contracting parties from carrying out, allowing or operating nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, space or submarine, as well as « any other nuclear explosion » that threatens to send nuclear debris into the territory of another state.  The term « any other nuclear explosion » prohibited peaceful nuclear explosions, as it was difficult to distinguish them from military tests without enhanced inspection measures.  In early 1959, a deadlock was lifted when Macmillan and Eisenhower, against opposition from the Ministry of Defence, agreed to consider banning separate tests of larger disarmament efforts.   The agreement was signed on 25 July 1963, just ten days after negotiations began. The next day, Kennedy gave a 26-minute televised address on the agreement and said that since the invention of nuclear weapons, « all humanity has struggled to escape the dark prospect of mass destruction on Earth… Yesterday, a skylight cut in the dark. Kennedy expressed the hope that a test ban would be the first step toward broader rapprochement, limit nuclear fallout, limit nuclear proliferation and slow down the arms race in a way that would enhance U.S.
security. Kennedy concluded his speech by referring to a Chinese proverb he had used two years earlier with Khrushchev in Vienna. « A journey of a thousand miles must start with a single step, » Kennedy said. « And if this trip is a thousand or more, note the story that we took the first step in this country at that time. »   When the nuclear powers pursued a no-test agreement, they also tried to fight with an emerging Communist China that at that time was pursuing its own nuclear program. In 1955, Mao Zedong expressed to the Soviet Union his belief that China could withstand a first nuclear strike and more than 100 million casualties. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union supported China`s nuclear program, while remaining on the verge of supplying an atomic bomb to China, followed by relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Khrushchev began the 1958 test ban talks with minimal preliminary discussions with China, and the agreement between the two countries on cooperation with military technology ended in June 1959.  Prior to the Moscow negotiations in the summer of 1963, Kennedy gave Harriman significant leeway to reach a « Soviet-American agreement » with China.
 Secret Sino-Soviet conversations in July 1963 revealed another disagreement between the two communist powers, with the Soviet Union issuing a statement that it did not share « the views of Chinese leaders on the creation of a thousand times greater civilization » on the corpses of hundreds of millions of people. The Soviet Union also ideologically criticized China`s nuclear policy and said that China`s apparent openness to nuclear war was « in flagrant contradiction with the idea of Marxism-Leninism » because a nuclear war « would not distinguish between the